It is also worth remembering that compute isolation is only half the problem. You can put code inside a gVisor sandbox or a Firecracker microVM with a hardware boundary, and none of it matters if the sandbox has unrestricted network egress for your “agentic workload”. An attacker who cannot escape the kernel can still exfiltrate every secret it can read over an outbound HTTP connection. Network policy where it is a stripped network namespace with no external route, a proxy-based domain allowlist, or explicit capability grants for specific destinations is the other half of the isolation story that is easy to overlook. The apply case here can range from disabling full network access to using a proxy for redaction, credential injection or simply just allow listing a specific set of DNS records.
As of publication, the letter has over 450 signatures, almost 400 of which come from Google employees and the rest from OpenAI. Currently, roughly 50 percent of all participants have chosen to attach their names to the cause, with the rest remaining anonymous. All are verified as current employees of these companies. The original organizers of the letter aren’t Google or OpenAI employees; they say are unaffiliated with any AI company, political party or advocacy group.
FT Magazines, including HTSI，这一点在Line官方版本下载中也有详细论述
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